

AESTHETICS OF DISABILITY: AESTHETIC VALUES IN THE ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract: This paper deals with the interpretation of the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) in the field of artistic creation from the standpoint of aesthetic evaluation, emphasizing the distinction between aesthetic and artistic valorisation within contemporary aesthetics research. The paper broadly compares two aesthetic perspectives – traditional and contemporary: the former is value-determined through the idea of beauty, while the latter directs its interpretive focus on the body, specifically the disabled body. By recognizing the similarity between the representation of disabled bodies and works of art generated with the help of artificial intelligence, the possibility arises to connect AI creation with the so-called disability aesthetics. In this way, the treatment of the body in modern art serves as a starting point for establishing a new ideology of aesthetic evaluation in era of late capitalism.

Keywords: disability aesthetics, aesthetic values, artificial intelligence, beauty, body

Disability aesthetics represents an attempt to theorize the representation of disability in contemporary art and visual culture. It is allegedly argued that what is current in art is perceived as disability, and in this way, disability evolves into an aesthetic value in itself. Here, we will attempt to reexamine this assumption through the ex-

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ample of using *Artificial Intelligence* (AI) in generating works of art in our time.

The question of value, writes Milan Damnjanović (Damnjanović 2017: 7), belongs to the realm of childish, philosophical, and metaphysical questions. Aesthetic values, such as beauty, for example, have long captivated the attention of researchers. They have generally been viewed as almost synonymous with ethical values (the so-called traditional view), but later also as autonomous. They were often equated with artistic values, although they were also interpreted separately. Even today, aesthetic evaluation, mainly connected with the problem of taste, remains one of the fundamental questions of aesthetics.

It is well-known how complex the concept of aesthetics is, and it is also known that one of the significant fields of research within this discipline is the domain of art. “Aesthetics is the study of a specific type of value”,¹ which, as Robert Stecker argues in an interview titled “Thinking About Art and Aesthetic Value”, can be found in many works of art, but also in almost every aspect of human life. Aesthetic values, says Stecker, manifest in our relationship with nature and the social environment; we perceive them in science and mathematics, in the artifacts we create, and in various activities such as meal preparation, playing games, shopping, going out, and so on. Thus, aesthetic values permeate every aspect of human life (Marshall 2024).

Stecker further argues that philosophical definitions should also invoke alternative ways of addressing related questions about aesthetic and artistic values (which, of course, are not identical), without arriving at definitive conclusions. One approach to addressing almost all central questions of the philosophy of art, by invoking aesthetics, was, according to Stecker, the approach that dominated the 20th century until the 1970s. He considers this view to be ‘dumbing down,’

¹ “Thinking About Art and Aesthetic Value”, an interview by Richard Marshall regarding Robert Stecker’s book *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction (Elements of Philosophy)*, as well as his interest in values in general, particularly philosophical, aesthetic, moral (ethical and artistic) values. Available at: <https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/thinking-about-art-and-aesthetic-value>, accessed: February 12, 2024.

meaning that art should not be reduced to something much less than what it truly offers (Marshall 2024)

Referring to Stecker, in the section of the text discussing aesthetic, artistic, and moral values (Sauchelli 2016: 515), the author notes that there are also complex (“composite”) values. Artistic values fall into such categories and can be defined as “aggregative” consisting of aesthetic, cognitive, and possibly historical values (Sauchelli 2016: 515). We would also add cultural values to this list. All these values influence the formation of the artistic value of a work/process/action, but they do not exhaust it.

Questions about the similarities and differences between aesthetic and artistic values are also relevant and interwoven when exploring creations generated by artificial intelligence. Although it is still in its early stages, works of art and effects produced by AI (with human involvement) are continually evaluated and compared to art created solely by *human beings*. In this context, a range of questions arises concerning the aesthetic and artistic evaluation of AI’s machine-generated outputs, which are intended for artistic as well as broader public/consumer/user audiences.

However, what aesthetic values associated with art represent, and which has become a commonplace in the study of aesthetics as the philosophy of art (and is often considered similar or identical), is understood quite differently when it comes to engineering knowledge and practice. In engineering activities, it is very difficult to identify aesthetic values for several reasons. One obvious reason is that professional aesthetic discourse is often focused on the realm of art, including so-called fine arts and literature. For many aestheticians, this philosophical discipline has become synonymous with the study or critique of art, and this conceptual apparatus seems inappropriate for other areas of aesthetic research, such as so-called engineering aesthetics, which is closely related to artificial intelligence activities. Another reason is that engineers and scientists working in this field often use terms like “beautiful”, which are typically indicators of aesthetic pleasure, to express something entirely different – such as cognitive satisfaction – or to emphasize their work of art in the broader public.

In this context, the term “beautiful” is mostly used colloquially and lacks philosophical weight.

Therefore, if we aim to understand the values involved in works of art that are products of AI, it is crucial to adopt a broad concept of aesthetic values. This should include categories that encompass epistemic, functional, and ethical values, as well as others such as beauty, elegance, harmony, simplicity, and so on. Whenever such aesthetic values contribute to preferences in engineering decisions, there is evidence that they simultaneously impact engineering activities (Schummer, MacLennan, Taylor 2009: 1031–1068).

On the other hand, in the field of contemporary art, the emergence of artificial intelligence has sparked debates about the nature of creativity, authorship, and, significantly for both aesthetics and contemporary art, the value of art itself. AI art, or art created by machines in collaboration with humans, certainly represents a creative domain that challenges traditional notions of artistic expression and provokes contemporary aestheticians to reassess their understanding of art.

Here, we will focus primarily on the artistic, and within that, the aesthetic values of works of art generated by artificial intelligence based on artistic ideas and predefined parameters. We will set aside the aesthetic evaluation of sensory phenomena, although aesthetic evaluation, as commonly encountered in aesthetic literature, is often equated with artistic evaluation. On the other hand, we will consider, at least incidentally, the mentioned engineering aesthetic values, as we believe this aspect of inquiry is important for works of art created by intelligent machines.

Regarding the conditionally accepted compositeness of artistic values, we might wonder if works of art generated by artificial intelligence are also composite in terms of their value structure. It is evident that aesthetic values are involved in AI-generated works of art, as, broadly speaking, all aesthetic experiences are realized through sensory mediums. The difference with AI-generated works of art is that the sensory (aesthetic) experience is not direct but is (exclusively) technically mediated. Thus, it is not the same field of sensibility, or sensory immediacy, which, in the case of traditional art (including

contemporary art without digital elements), affects our mind, emotions, and so on.

In fact, this is about extending our sensory experience into the digital domain of operation. As for cognitive values, they are also embedded in the complex perceptual system of AI works of art, especially since the working process, similar to conceptual art, starts from concepts, key terms, guidelines, and instructions given to creative machines by their creators. The materials with which artificial intelligence operates do not arise on their own but are generated through concepts or the interplay of multiple ideas that guide the creative work of the machines. Likely, the cognitive dimension of value is more pronounced here compared to traditional art, excluding conceptual art and all its later derivatives.

In terms of the historical context of evaluation, which is implicitly present in machine-generated art, it is important to explain precisely what is meant. Although machines do not have experience, including historical experience, and their memory is mechanical rather than *subjective*, they still operate within a (post)historical context. This is because AI conceptual work of art is based on digitized historical artifacts. Machines that create art compensate for their lack of experience by processing data stored on the internet or in other databases. Therefore, they not only participate in the world of art history by creating new works of art based on the processing of old ones but would be unable to create anything without this historical subject matter. In other words, the historical world is constitutive of AI-generated works of art, as they would not be possible without it.

When it comes to works of art of artificial intelligence, the question arises of how to evaluate them, especially given the incoherent understanding of art and artistic practices in conjunction with new technologies. In this context, there is also the question of what AI art actually is, how we define it, and how we relate to it. Artificial intelligence, as commonly understood, is a tool or technical support for designing art, but it is also a new form and type of art. The works of art produced by artificial intelligence represent a new form of integration between contemporary art and intelligent technologies.

Let's recall some historical facts. Traditionally, creativity was viewed as an exclusively human endeavor, a manifestation of human personality, ideas, creativity, and imagination. However, the emergence of AI art prompts us to reconsider this perspective. If a machine (algorithm) can create a work of art based on certain instructions that evoke emotions, tell a story, or provoke thought, can we say that the machine was creative? Similarly, if AI merely follows a set of programmed instructions, can its output truly be considered creative? And how is such activity evaluated? What are the criteria for evaluation, and do they significantly differ from traditional ones?

To begin a discussion on the evaluation of AI-generated (artistic) works, we will contrast two opposing philosophical viewpoints. The first perspective, presented in MIT Technology Review's article "A philosopher argues that an AI can't be an artist: Creativity is, and always will be a human endeavor" (Kelly 2019), denies the possibility that AI-generated works of art can surpass the human mind and asserts that human creativity will not be subject to advancements in technology. The article emphasizes that the artist, as a human being, will remain superior to machines, just as has been the case throughout history. However, this statement does not hold absolute value, as the text argues, since it depends on "the norms that allow us to guide our culture and our expectations of technology" (Kelly 2019). In other words, the value context, i.e., the cultural world we inherit, create, and shape – significantly influences the evaluation of AI's work of art in the realm of artistic creation.

In contrast to this belief, a philosophy student from Glasgow, in the context of evaluating the art of AI artists, posed a hypothetical question that builds on the Turing test² – "But what if one day you were told that all the world's art was produced by artificial intelligence. Would that change anything for you?" (Stewart 2020). He fur-

² The Turing Test was created by Alan Turing, a British mathematician and scientist who pioneered the development of the modern computer. This test offers a structured way to assess whether the "subject" or machine being tested, is genuinely intelligent – meaning, whether it exhibits human-like cognitive abilities.

ther argues that (human) artistic methods have never been clear and are based on a chaotic continuum. In this regard, the question arises whether new, original AI art could influence aesthetic judgment – specifically, the definition of those qualities that constitute the aesthetic value of a work of art. Finally, he believes that the development of original AI art, looking retrospectively, could influence the redefinition or supplementation of aesthetic values. For instance, if the entire world of art were created by artificial intelligence, then its activity would be the sole measure of evaluating the value of all existing works of art (Stewart 2020).

In principle, the value of AI-generated artworks is based on comparing the processes and methods of artistic creation between human-made art and works of art produced by artificial intelligence. These comparative methods are mostly qualitative in nature, making them difficult to describe and define. However, some form of ideology always underlies them. Judging by how AI-generated artworks fare in the art market (auctions³, gallery and online sales, etc.), it can be concluded that the market largely determines the value of AI-generated works of art, from the standpoint of production, circulation, consumption, and feedback of the audience. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the criteria for evaluation (at least when it comes to visual AI art), quantitative parameters are introduced alongside qualitative ones, forming the so-called “valuation index” (Wang, Ma 2019: 445-449).

In the beginning, however, when it came to visual arts, the qualitative evaluation of machine-generated works of art prevailed over market valuation. This can be illustrated by the example of Aaron, the first painting robot (the AARON software).⁴ It is a well-known

³ The evaluation of AI-generated (artistic) works is a specialized area of aesthetic research. In 2018, a piece titled “Portrait of Edmond de Belamy” was sold for \$432,500 at Christie’s auction house, far exceeding its initial estimated value. This event sparked intense debate within both professional circles and the general public about the value of AI-created works of art.

⁴ On the Computer History Museum’s website (CHM), Chris Garcia writes: “Harold Cohen was a pioneer in computer art, algorithmic art, and

fact that one of the pioneers of AI art, Harold Cohen, trained Aaron as a traditional painter; the Aaron robot successfully represented Great Britain at significant international festivals as early as the 1960s, including the Venice and Paris Biennales, Documenta 3, and others. In addition to being exhibited online, his works of art are stored in the collections of renowned galleries such as Tate Modern. Cohen is said to have dedicated his entire professional career to exploring the creative powers of artificial intelligence through the AARON software, which he developed and refined for over 40 years. Despite this, his works of art did not sell well in the art market and, by comparison, did not even reach 1% of the price paid for Obvious's AI art ("Portrait of Edmond de Belamy").

If, however, we were to avoid a literal comparison between human creativity and AI activity in the field of art (here we refer to specific works of art), and instead examine the subject of research from the standpoint of how we evaluate one production or the other rather than what we evaluate, we could refer to entirely different theoretical or aesthetic perspectives that can be applied both to beauty and to other artifacts, whether of human or artificial origin. The scope of comparison would encompass all traditional (primarily Euro-American) art, which is mostly based on the idea of beauty, on one hand, and non-traditional, i.e., part of contemporary art (such as Dadaism or Expressionism, for example) and works of art of artificial intelligence, on the other.

The starting point for classification, following one of the many hypotheses in contemporary aesthetics, is the human body and its representation in the world of art. Traditionally, this evaluation was generally linked to beautiful bodies (harmonious, symmetrical); before

generative art; but as he told me one afternoon in 2010, he was first and foremost a painter. He was also an engineer whose work defined the first generation of computer-generated art. His system, AARON, is one of the longest-running, continually maintained AI systems in history. Harold Cohen was an exceptional artist, an impressive engineer, and an important bridge between those two worlds." On the webpage: <https://computerhistory.org/blog/harold-cohen-and-aaron-a-40-year-collaboration/>, accessed: 15.02.2024.

the modern art, the body was rarely depicted as “degenerate,” except when, for instance, evil or depictions of hellish torment justified the “aesthetics of the ugly”. Representations of degenerate bodies—such as hunchbacks, dwarfs, portraits with scars, and deformed noses—like Shakespeare’s Richard III, Hugo’s Quasimodo, Leroux’s Phantom of the Opera, and Velázquez’s court dwarf—were exceptions that deviated from the norms (conventions, standards, canons) of beauty for what were often “aesthetically justified” reasons. However, critical studies in visual culture (parallel to reflections in Foucault’s work of art “*Les Anormaux*”) support the representation of deformed bodies in painting, sculpture, video art, and even architecture and film (e.g., Wiene’s “The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari”).

In visual arts and media, there is a distinction that goes beyond differentiating the actual body from its representation (which often highlights perfection). This distinction can also be viewed through the lens of the ideology of representation, which, by implication, is based on certain aesthetic values (and vice versa). According to such perspectives, bodily disability can become constitutive of identity politics conceived “in a new register” (Siebers 2015: 272–291). The ideology of representing bodies, or embodiment, can be established not only in terms of appearance but also in terms of the body’s capabilities and functions. Hence, it is likely not coincidental that athletes and their bodies served as models for Greek sculptors of the Periclean era.

Above mentioned ideology of body abilities (the “*ideology of ability*”) in standard conceptualizations and artistic practices is represented through certain patterns and values (e.g., authority associated with athletes, warriors, and leaders), while disability often remains “in the shadows” of this ideology (Siebers 2015: 272–291). Some art movements, particularly those engaged with social issues, may aim to raise awareness about *disability* and highlight its varieties using artistic means, adhering to different (bodily) values. In reality, all bodies should be considered equally valuable, and the complexity of understanding and representing disability provides more opportuni-

ties to comprehend humanity in its diversity (physically, spiritually, culturally, historically, etc.).

The so-called “*disability aesthetics*” as previously mentioned, represents a significant attempt to theorize the representation of disability in modern art and visual culture, thereby reconfiguring the question of artistic value in certain ways. In this context, this theory advocates a radical viewpoint that modernity in art can be perceived as a form of disability, and thus, disability evolves into an aesthetic value in itself. Interestingly, this perspective, associated with the modern era and its characteristic orientation in contemporary aesthetics, can also be applied to the role of artificial intelligence in the field of artistic creation.

However, it is important to recall that what we refer to as dominant aesthetics has traditionally been based on the idea of beauty. Over time, especially thanks to modern media technologies, this concept of beauty—which largely stemmed from Plato’s idea of the beautiful—has transformed into the notion of perfection, which the latest technology could represent, correct, and enhance. The reasons for this transformation were, of course, rather ordinary. Every commodity, including our own bodies, became part of the broader concept of consumer society. In certain historical moments, disabled bodies, faces scarred by wounds, inherited from wars (such as World War I and II, civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, etc.), became unsuitable for the gaze of citizens who saw their own war traumas reflected in these incomplete and deformed bodies.

Aesthetic surgery, as is well known, originated in Paris after World War I to make public spaces more pleasant by ensuring that “mutilated faces” were no longer visible on the streets (Vuksanović 2001), i.e. numerous post-war disabled individuals. Although the post-war period gave rise to aesthetic surgery, it reached its peak with the development of modern media, especially television, erasing anything “less than perfect” from the consumer’s view. Thus, in the shadow of television and simulated reality, all those who were different – perhaps not grotesque, but imperfect, insufficiently beautiful, and

less media-attractive, remained hidden. The ideology of consumption subtly evolved into a dictatorship of perfect (aesthetic) appearances.

“Today’s aesthetic surgery, even in less drastic situations than those of war and post-war periods, directly intervenes in the realm of aesthetic appearances by erasing signs of socially and historically undesirable events, which now exist only in the memories of so-called ‘virtual spaces/times’. The political discourse here is evidently replaced by the movements of surgical knives and lasers, aimed at a humane form of aestheticization, thus gaining an entirely new dimension with the tendency to affect not just the appearance but the ‘essence’ or identity in its former sense” (Vuksanović 200: 340).

Therefore, aesthetic surgery today does not only intervene on the body but also affects the identity layers of human beings. As the body and soul are in a dialectical relationship, the ideology of perfect and capable bodies reflects deeper layers of identity: “Scarred souls thus do not exist. They are not present in reality if the traces of suffering and destruction etched on human skin are erased. Just as death can be made appealing when spectacularly aestheticized, gaining a humane visage through modern pharmacology within the aesthetic-communicative matrix of contemporary civilization” (Vuksanović 2001: 340).

Invalid bodies, opposed to bodies for consumption, the ideology of diversity versus uniformity, the real world versus perfect (bodily) representations – all of these are diametrically opposed (aesthetic) viewpoints and values that coexist in our time. Moreover, if contemporary art conceptually presents degenerated, imperfect bodies instead of exploiting them, it then becomes a critical tool for undermining the “polished” consumerism and its bodily fetishes that inundate the media reality. However, even with these value positions, one must be cautious, as invalid bodies, positively discriminated, can also be fetishized and integrated into the mega-industry of culture and entertainment.

Moreover, the results obtained through aesthetic interventions on the body, whether real or in virtual space, are not necessarily satisfying for commercial culture, as even it cannot fully absorb and

accept “perfect forms” as human beauty. Hence, kitsch emerges as a reaction. Let’s cite here one striking example from the past. The Nazis, as is well known, in their approach to the body and race, in many ways anticipated the so-called “culture of commercial beauty”. However, such faces and bodies actually appeared monstrous, even from the standpoint of commercial culture (Levin 2010). Artificial intelligence, on the other hand, unlike other media, “plays the card” of the otherness of invalid bodies.

In this sense, artificial intelligence can serve as a kind of compensatory tool for certain physical activities that the user is unable to perform on their own. However, since disability is typically treated today, both medically and socially (and as we previously mentioned – ideologically), as an irreplaceable deficiency, much can be bridged and artistically enhanced with the help of artificial intelligence. Thus, one form of contemporary artistic activism is focused on connecting the body with artificial intelligence, not only to overcome tasks related to the everyday existence of people with special needs but also to create artistic projects/works with the assistance of AI.

One example of using artificial intelligence algorithms for these purposes is the project titled “Prosthetic Memory” from 2020. The author, who created this project journey (under the pseudonym M Eifler), is an artist and researcher from the USA who experiments with embodied/spatial interactions, utilizing so-called “speculative archives” (one of the methods of imaginative AI work of art, considered the future of craft skills, known as “Future Crafting”) and computational prosthetics. Due to impairments not only in memory but also in speech, the artist primarily expresses herself through the mediums of painting, sculpture, video, and VR/AR technology.

Since childhood, M had suffered from such brain damage that she lost the ability to remember. To address her long-term memory problems, she turned to the possibilities of artificial intelligence. Because the artist couldn’t recall anything from her life history, not even the most important dates and events, this motivated her to begin her artistic work at home. Thus, artificial intelligence, adapted for personalized use, served as a tool to supplement her memory while

also supporting her creative work. As a “work in progress” this project, which was funded by the European Union, received an award (2020 S+T+ARTS Prize Jury). The jury’s reasoning, to paraphrase, noted that the artist illustrates how home-based artificial intelligence, operating on a “do-it-yourself” principle, designed exclusively for personal use and generated without any data stored in the *Cloud*, can empower access to this technology and simultaneously enhance human abilities. The project, as stated in the jury’s announcement, adequately responds to the challenges of humanizing technology, which is generally perceived negatively. “Prosthetic Memory” was therefore recognized as a relevant artistic exploration of the relationship between humans and artificial intelligence (Ars Electronica 2020). As can be seen, the aesthetic evaluation of the artistic work in collaboration with artificial intelligence, aimed at overcoming the artist’s difficulties related to her own memories on the one hand, and artistic expression on the other, is achieved thanks to the humane aspect of AI technology.

It is interesting to note that, thanks to *disability aesthetics* – which not only deals with physical bodies and their abilities/capabilities in the narrower sense of the term but also with those bodies that are enhanced by various prosthetics (which certainly falls under the processes of cyborgization and current transhumanist interpretations of such phenomena) and no longer carry racial or gender markers (i.e., the “identity” key of recognition and differentiation) – the value framework of such an aesthetics becomes one of the important paradigms in questioning contemporary AI art. At the same time, by relating aesthetics to artificial intelligence, as well as art to AI, disability aesthetics seeks to challenge those aesthetic theories that are, in principle, based on idealism, opposing them not only with the materiality of the body but also with its technologically produced extensions. Artificial intelligence, as a tool for compensating deficiencies and enhancing the body (where the body, of course, includes the brain and neural structure of human beings), as well as its potential transformation, is now seen not only as a medical and social aid but also as a co-author or “producer” of art. Moreover, by countering the ide-

ology of “mimesis”, AI art does not aim to imitate reality but rather to reconstitute it.

As such, it can draw inspiration from physical deficiencies and depict human bodies with certain interventions as a possible and real existence (for example, showing bodies with three fingers, unnatural skin colors, distorted faces, and the like). The ideology of portraying human bodies as “unnatural” through AI art, and the intentional representation of grotesque forms or bodies with pronounced deficiencies, is not necessarily interpreted as bad art if the underlying (value-based, ideological) theory of interpretation is reflected. What does this actually mean? In which direction is the current valuation of contemporary art moving – is what is disabled inherently artistically valuable if it is shown that real disabilities coincide with machine-generated “deficiencies” perpetuated by the use of artificial intelligence for artistic purposes?

In the case of artificial intelligence, only the knowledge (about intentions), and not the result of creation, plays a significant role in evaluating the value of the work of art, and this evaluation is inherent, meaning it is seen in the context of a particular ideology of representation. For example, distinguishing between a horror scene and a critical engagement with the representation of something grotesque does not occur at the level of immediate perception but within the realm of reception, i.e., the artistic experience, as well as the aesthetic interpretation which includes not only knowledge of the technological capabilities of artificial intelligence but also its potential creative, ethical, political, and ideological uses.

An example frequently highlighted in this context is a project initially realized (independently of the artistic work) within the advertising industry, which shows women laughing over a bowl of salad. This later evolved, likely as an initial idea, into one of the well-known series of AI-generated artworks. Unlike the advertisements, where the focus was on the relationship between women and salad (i.e. /vegan/ diet), in the AI artistic work we refer to as an illustration, every segment depicts a woman laughing unnaturally, with characteristic excesses of fingers, teeth, etc., compared to the advertisements

that represented an ordinary woman laughing over a bowl of salad. In this regard, writer Noah Berlatsky argues that the artistic work titled “Women Laughing Alone with Salad”, created in collaboration between artist Matthew Nipse and artificial intelligence, suitably illustrates the thesis that, viewed from the perspective of different aesthetic values, the project of presenting women laughing over a bowl of salad, on one hand, disturbs, and on the other, showcases the brilliance of an artistic work; this is also reflected in the title of his text: “AI Art Shows the Value of Disability Aesthetics” (Berlatsky 2024).

Based on the discussion of AI and disability aesthetics, the following implications can be drawn in terms of value. Artificial intelligence, when representing “otherness” incorporated into the creative act, can use data on various bodily and sensory experiences to create new ways of representing disability. Consequently, AI art has the potential to question and, potentially, deconstruct normative views of the body and its capabilities. Through generative models, artists can explore the body through its various processes and versions, including those that reflect bodily differences or disabilities, thereby expanding the subject of aesthetics to include disabled bodies, specifically represented in the art sphere. As we have seen, AI technologies also enable the creation of interactive artworks that are inclusive of people with disabilities; artificial intelligence can adapt art installations to be accessible to people with special needs, such as installations that respond to speech or movement. Additionally, AI art should facilitate an experience of empathy towards people with disabilities. Through simulations and visualizations, it can help the audience or users of AI content to experience perspectives from the viewpoint of a person with a disability, promoting understanding and respect for different aesthetic values. However, on an ethical and political level, there is a challenge regarding how AI is used to create art that depicts disability. It is crucial that AI art is not employed in a way that could be offensive or exploitative towards people with disabilities. Therefore, artists and developers need to be aware of potential negative consequences related to AI creation in the context of disability aesthetics.

If we were to summarize the conclusion that emerges from all the previous discussions, the aesthetic evaluation of AI art depends less on the technical skills required to create a work of art akin to that of a human artist, but rather on the underlying ideology. This ideology can be recognized either by the artist's intentions in creating works of art in collaboration with artificial intelligence or by the content and form of the work of art itself. The distinction, therefore, is not established by focusing on the concept of authorship. In this sense, in terms of skills, human and machine can be equated – which is more a matter of status in the creation process than a “substantive” difference. If only the work of art is evaluated, without knowing who or what created it, it can be judged either from the perspective of traditional values (beauty or artistic beauty) or from the standpoint of various directions in contemporary art.

Within the framework of contemporary art and aesthetics, the value of AI-produced works of art is still being scrutinized, and stable value bases are sought in this inquiry. Currently, in the realm of evaluation, there are those theorists and practitioners who see AI merely as a tool for proliferating kitsch (failed art) that parasites on the creative work of art of others (conservative creators and aestheticians who deny the aesthetic value of AI-generated works of art), as well as those who believe that the use of artificial intelligence in artistic purposes not only fulfills its aesthetically valuable mission by creating new works of art but also performs a socially beneficial function by drawing attention to prevailing cultural values, which can be critically questioned through such created art.

One should also not overlook who is evaluating and from which social position they are doing so. If part of contemporary art seeks to mark its otherness as a diversity that does not rest on consumerism or the idealism of previous eras, but instead participates in the realm of imperfection, then smart machines may be a solution for a number of people/creators with specific ideas and needs. If, indeed, every need of ours reflects imperfection, then collaborative creation with machines offers an illusion of completeness. At the same time, this illusion may be suitable for market exchange and exploitation. Ultimately, it all

comes down to the same thing - money as an abstract commodity value and new trends brought about by technological development. In other words, differences based on special needs and machines that smooth out those differences reduce contemporary AI creation to one thing: the former excess or deficit that was compensated by smart machines. This is one justification for the existence of such machines, but certainly not for generalizing this idea.

Although humane impulses, motives, and ideas underpin the concept of disability aesthetics and the AI technology that supports this concept, not only ideologically but also through its own structure (one in diversity), art, as is known, resists instrumentalization if it is true art. It denies every prescribed framework, transcends eras, and achieves freedom in its own unique and unpredictable manner. Finally, art should not be humane support to the inhumane world of capital, although this does not exclude its fundamental mission even in an oppressed world. Its values have always been tied to the horizons of universal experience, which integrates numerous differences – spiritual, bodily, technological, ideological, and class. Art is both a means of struggle and the struggle itself for the emancipation of the whole as well as its individual parts. Thus, all the values it upholds are not only humane but also values of freedom.

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